Thin Line

No, I wouldn't say Prentice-Mott is a twit, but I would argue he's not acknowledging some American media efforts to spotlight these kinds of counter-insurgency tactics by our officials. The Nation magazine, and similar Progressive journals (online and off) have indeed reported on the regular practice of American payoffs to local Iraqi and Afghani tribes to "encourage" their cooperation. The real debate seems to be the use of the term "bribe." Are these tactics "bribes?" I'd have to know more about exactly what the Italians were hoping to secure with this money, but quite frankly if our best strategy in the region is to give cash payouts for muted retaliation, I'd argue we have no real strategy to begin with.

Enemy corrupts YOU!

In 2001, a small group of Americans with large suitcases stuffed with cash, won the hearts and minds of Afghan warlords. Money, in this case, bought enough loyalty to rout the Taliban and drive Al-Qaeda into the tribal lands of Pakistan. The Bush team did not capably exploit this stunner but many an American family was gratified that their sons and daughters were spared because of it. Please recall that the British regulars' main complaint about the American irregulars 235 years ago was that we didn't fight fair; we didn't fight like gentlemen.

Right, and during the Afghan war against Russia, the United States financed Afghani tribal insurgents (Osama Bin Laden among them) to repel the Soviets; a painfully short-sighted strategy at best. It buys us short-term advantage but always seems to portend long-term disaster. As you point out, in 2001 we paid off Afghani warlords (to our benefit); but guess what? We're still in Afghanistan, fighting a war without end, to the tune of 3.6 billion dollars per month. Money, I might add, that we don't have. So tell me, richsteckler, how does this end?

While you lay out two plausible scenarios, I think you draw conclusions too easily. You state the first option (the so-called half-measure) “would likely lead to a return of the Taliban and their ally Bin Laden to Kabul.” I think this is a misplaced argument at best, since Bin Laden is likely dead, or near-dead, and the Taliban aren't the reason we're in Afghanistan in the first place. We're there for Al-Qaeda, who are presently in Pakistan. In your second option, the go-for-the-win scenario, you state: “The people of Afghanistan would be given a measure of security.” Again, this in not provable by you or anyone else. Right now Afghanistan has no stable government, and even after the upcoming runoff election, there's little evidence our political position there will be any more secure (particularly if Karzai loses). In a story that broke earlier this week, it was revealed that Karzai's brother, a poppy-dealer who trades with the Taliban, is on the payroll of the C.I.A., making our efforts there even more suspect (since these payoffs inadvertantly fund the Taliban). Lastly, the one option you didn't lay out needs to be considered: Phased Withdrawl. Yes, it will be messy, yes we will lose some stature as a super-power; but if we forge a strong alliance with Pakistan, and work with them to weed out Al-Qaeda, and if we utilize Special Forces teams in concert with solid intelligence and precision drones, I would argue that we'd do no worse than blindly sending 40,000 troops (and more later) for another nine, fifteen, twenty, or thirty years, at a cost of 3.6 billion per month, to referee a civil war that we can't possibly end.